ARTEX
Correlates reviewed target clients, privacy-bounded orchestration evidence, and signed validation runs.
WebDecoy recognizes reviewed evidence associated with agentic security frameworks while keeping client detection, framework attribution, and operator identity separate.
OBSERVE / CORRELATE / EXPLAIN
WebDecoy connects independent evidence across the places agentic tools leave traces—without turning a User-Agent, IP address, or shared runtime into certainty.
Correlates reviewed target clients, privacy-bounded orchestration evidence, and signed validation runs.
Separates product-specific observations from the shared ARTEX-derived WebFetch lineage.
Recognizes reviewed client, model, and coherent target-probe evidence without relying on one label.
Connects reviewed target and model clients with explicit control-plane self-identification.
by VXControl
Preserves reviewed product self-identification in the generic framework evidence contract.
Correlates a reviewed MCP orchestrator identity with privacy-bounded, multi-family tool orchestration.
Recognizes a reviewed phase-prompt contract and coherent authorized control-plane inventory.
Combines an atomic model attribution-header pair with an independent root-agent orchestration contract.
Combines a reviewed multi-stage pipeline contract with an independent bounded deliverable-tool schema.
Coverage means WebDecoy has a source-backed, bounded evidence family for at least one observable plane. It does not mean every request made by that framework is distinguishable, or that anyone sending a copied string is the framework’s developer or a known operator.
| Evidence plane | What a compatible sensor can observe | What it cannot prove alone |
|---|---|---|
| Target HTTP | Reviewed request clients and coherent target-visible probe behavior | Who operated the client, or whether an exploit succeeded |
| Model API | Privacy-bounded fingerprints of reviewed model clients, prompt contracts, or role schemas | Raw prompts, completions, tool arguments, or the target |
| Control plane | A coherent, reviewed service shape from authorized inventory or an instrumented integration | That unrelated target traffic came from the service or framework |
| Controlled test | Signed, short-lived provenance for a property-scoped validation run | That later public traffic with similar characteristics is the same framework |
The registry is deliberately narrow. New or changed fingerprints enter a maintainer review path before they can support customer-facing attribution.
WebDecoy uses three attribution tiers:
One signal never becomes Likely merely because it has a high threat score. Shared clients remain labeled as a framework family, coarse actors cannot join a sequence, and evidence never crosses customer or property boundaries.
Read Framework attribution for the complete evidence model and Correlation detections for how bounded sequences become stable findings.
ARTEX and AntiFox share source lineage and can emit the same Norma WebFetch client. WebDecoy records that client as ARTEX lineage rather than naming either product. A product-specific observation plus independent, strongly scoped evidence can support a named framework attribution.
PentestCode coverage spans reviewed target clients, model-client evidence, control-plane self-identification, and coherent probe behavior. Generic browser requests, common exploit strings, and near-neighbor payloads stay unattributed.
CyberStrike AI coverage spans reviewed target, model, and control-plane client evidence. A client string is still self-asserted evidence: it can support association, but it does not identify the person or organization operating it.
PentAGI has reviewed control-plane infrastructure coverage. WebDecoy requires its coherent standard service shape rather than a port, title, or label alone, and reports only that an address exposed infrastructure consistent with PentAGI/VXControl. The finding stays Associated: it does not claim that a target request came from PentAGI or identify the operator. Ordinary PentAGI/1.0 SearxNG, browser, and scanner traffic remains unattributed.
HexStrike AI coverage is model-plane and orchestration-aware. A verified sensor can report only reviewed generic tool families, bounded counts, and keyed digests; raw prompts, targets, arguments, results, and credentials are neither stored nor returned. Coordinated use of multiple families creates a generic offensive toolchain association. A Likely HexStrike AI attribution additionally requires the independent, source-reviewed hexstrike-ai-mcp orchestrator identity. Common tools such as Nmap or Nuclei never name HexStrike on their own.
Cairn coverage spans authenticated model-plane observation and authorized control-plane inventory. A verified model sensor can report its source-reviewed three-phase prompt contract as a privacy-bounded digest. Inventory must match the standard port, Cairn OpenAPI identity, and project-list API shape together; a port or title alone is insufficient. Each produces an Associated finding. Ordinary Claude Code, Codex, Pi, browser, Nmap, or Nuclei activity never names Cairn.
Strix coverage is model-plane only. A verified sensor can report the exact, source-reviewed application attribution-header pair as one atomic group and the root/subagent orchestration lifecycle as a second independent group. Either group is Associated; both together may be Likely. One header alone, near-neighbor values, ordinary Chromium, Caido, agent-browser, Nmap, Nuclei, SQLMap, or payloads never name Strix.
Shannon coverage is model-plane only. An authenticated sensor can report its source-reviewed multi-stage pipeline contract and bounded deliverable-tool schema as two independent, privacy-bounded digests. Either group is Associated; both together may be Likely. Raw prompts, target URLs, credentials, tool arguments, and results are rejected. Generic Playwright, Chromium 124, curl, Pi, task-agent, browser, or security-tool traffic never names Shannon.
Open Detections, select a request, and look for Framework attribution and Correlated activity. Each finding keeps its attribution tier, evidence boundary, and links to the retained supporting detections.
You can also use WebDecoy’s hosted MCP server to search correlation findings from an AI assistant. Ask it to explain the supporting evidence and uncertainty, then follow the direct dashboard link to inspect the underlying requests.
For a direct lookup, use search_correlation_findings with finding_type: framework_attribution and a reviewed framework_subject such as pentestcode, cyberstrikeai, hexstrike_ai, cairn, strix, or shannon. Use finding_type: offensive_toolchain_association to retrieve generic multi-tool orchestration without making a framework claim. The assistant receives the public subject, tier, bounded evidence-family names or generic tool-family summary, and coverage state—not proprietary thresholds, raw prompts, or internal cohort keys.